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Recent empirical growth literature suggests that cultural factors play a decisive role in 
economic development, while empirical evidence for their impact on government activity 
remains scant. In this paper, we conjecture based on Weber’s Protestant Ethics that 
‚Protestant values’ such as self-reliance and austerity should affect both the size and 
scope of governments. More specifically, we hypothesize that smaller government 
budgets should be observable in more Protestant jurisdictions. Using a panel of sub-
federal expenditure in 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 we find supporting evidence, 
observing that the share of Protestants in the cantonal residential population exerts a 
spending dampening impact. Our results suggest that cultural factors should not be 
omitted from future public finance analyses.  
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1)  Introduction 
Recent research on the determinants of government spending have set their focus on 
institutional and political factors, such as, for example, the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, direct democracy, or political competition (for an overview, see 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007). However, while most of the public finance studies 
avoid the omission of age-dependent preferences by controlling for age structure of the 
population, most of them have neglected the influences exerted by culture-specific 
preferences in the population.
1 Such culture-determined population preferences might be 
approximated by observable socio-demographic characteristics such as the ethnic and 
religious composition of the citizenry (for a justification, see Dorn et al, 2007).  
The main goal of our paper is to make an attempt to fill parts of this research gap by 
analyzing the effects of values relating to Protestant belief systems on government 
spending, exploiting the variation in religious composition across 26 states/cantons 
within Switzerland between 1980 and 1998. The federal country Switzerland is 
particularly suitable for such an analysis as its second-tier government are not only quite 
autonomous in the public goods’ provision (schooling, welfare, health, police), differing 
in their political institutions and governance structure (see Feld, and Matsusaka, 2003), 
but also and more importantly, as already noted by Delacroix and Nielsen (2001), vary in 
the religious composition of their cantonal populations. Moreover, in contrast to those 
Northern European countries that adopted moderate Lutheranian Protestantism, the type 
                                                 
1 An exception pertains to Schaltegger and Torgler (2006) who investigate the correlation between trust in 
the governments and their fiscal performance in Swiss cantons.        5 
of Protestantism that was founded and promoted by Calvin (Geneva) and Zwingli 
(Zurich) in Switzerland was of the extreme type – the type of ‘ascetic’ Protestantism 
Weber refers to in his famous work “Die Protestantische Ethik”, allowing for an 
application of his findings. To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first studies to 
empirically analyze the relation between religion-based values and government spending.  
Our empirical results support our hypothesis: they reveal that a larger share of Protestants 
in the cantonal population leads to less sub-federal government spending. Thus, our 
results also reveal that omitting culture-driven heterogeneous population preferences in 
public finance models should be avoided.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 derives our hypothesis 
from sociological and economic literature on the nature of Protestant values and their 
impact on societal development, while the section 3 describes the relevant Swiss data for 
our empirical analysis. The econometric model is introduced in section 4, the empirical 
results of which are presented in section 5. Robustness tests are carried out in sections 6. 
Finally, section 7 summarizes and concludes.  
       6 
2)  Theoretical considerations 
Weber (1930)’s canonical hypothesis of ‘Ascetic Protestantism’ relates ‘Protestantism’ to 
the subjection of human activities to the rationality principle, work discipline of both 
entrepreneurs and laborers likewise, compliance with business contract due to the 
abolishment of the institution of ‘penance’
2, promotion of literacy, and the replacement of 
the traditional class system-based ‘social elect’ with the ‘spiritual elect’. All these 
features serve jointly and separately as explanations for the emergence of modern 
capitalism and the economic growth that occurred in Northern-European, Protestants 
cities compared to Southern-European, Catholic cities (Clark, 1951; Frey, 1998; Blum 
and Dudley, 2001; Delacroix and Nielsen, 2001; Becker and Wössmann, 2007).
3  
In the center of Ascetic Protestantism is the predestination theory and the need for 
believers to continuously demonstrate through their worldly activities that ‘they have 
been elected’, mainly through adherence to a specific life style and morale principles.
4 
Living this ascetic Protestant ethics implies, ceteris paribus, i.e. compared to the behavior 
of the Catholic counterparts, a more economic profit oriented approach combined with a 
thriftier attitude, namely not to consume the fruits of one’s labor (excess consumption) 
                                                 
2 It is claimed to have facilitated cooperation in a one-shot game setting, i.e. trade with strangers (Blum and 
Dudley, 2001). The expulsion of Protestants in Catholic-dominated countries contributed to the economic 
growth gap. 
3 A related strand of literature corroborates the causal relation between broadly defined Protestant values 
and economic development, both during the contemporary period and the pre-20
th century past (Blum and 
Dudley, 2001, Granato et al., 1996; Becker and Wössmann, 2007; Cavalcanti et al., 2007) A theoretical 
growth model with the driving factor being accumulated capital as a measure of piety serving as positional 
good with externalities to the social norm is developed by Rauscher (1997).   
4 In contrast, Catholics believe that through good deeds good’s grace can be ‘earned’, while such 
‘transaction’ is not possible in a Protestants’ world view (Frey, 1998).        7 
but to save or re-invest it.
5 In consequence, viewing individual (economic) welfare as a 
signal for ‘being chosen’ denies any morale obligation to aid persons in need, which 
would actually constitute an interference with the divine plans.
6 This Protestants ethics 
also leads to a devaluation of ‘unproductive’ and ‘uncontrolled’, i.e. spontaneity 
encouraging, leisure activities, in general, and sports and dancing, in particular.
7 Finally, 
it also implies a stronger focus on functionality of goods of the daily life that, for 
example, demands simpler clothing and the abolishment of ‘unnecessary’ ornaments.  
The same way religious values that evolved in the 16
th and 17
th centuries are shown to 
influence today’s human behavior (e.g. Arruñada, 2004), they may equally shape current 
population preferences, finally impacting policy outcomes. How would then government 
spending be affected ?
8 First of all, assuming a strong preference for private savings 
accumulation, Protestants as defined above should prefer relatively low tax levels. 
Second, given the cultural heritage of being solely responsible for one own’s well-being, 
Protestants should have a taste for less welfare spending.
9 As regards overall public 
goods creation, even if the number of demanded public goods were identical across 
Protestant and Catholic regions, Protestants should reject anything that could be 
perceived as an unnecessary luxury, going beyond its pure functionality. Therefore, we 
conjecture: 
                                                 
5 For empirical evidence using historical data on deposits in savings banks, see Delacroix and Nielsen 
(2001).  
6 In other words, the poor are not entitled to aid, which does not contradict the moral duty of (voluntary) 
charity-giving (Frey, 1998).   
7 Historically, protestant Ethics also laid grounds to accepting market competition among sellers, which 
was originally prevented and hampered by the middle-aged guild system that regulated the production 
technology and the price of their members (Weingast, 1995). 
8 Barro and McCleary (2003) show that it is religion-based values rather than church attendance rates that matter 
to economic growth. For an account of the literature demonstrating the strong time-invariance of values related to 
religion see Dorn et al (2007).   
9 For an empirical linkage between the lesser generosity and broadness of the US welfare systems with the 
view of the poor as ‘lazy’ (as opposed to ‘misfortunate’) and Protestantism, see Alesina et al. (2001).         8 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, the share of Protestants exerts a lowering impact on 
government spending.  
 
3)  Data and descriptive statistics 
Our research question is analyzed using a time-series cross-sectional panel for 26 Swiss 
cantons from 1980 – 1998, an observational period employed in most empirical studies 
on government spending in Switzerland (see, e.g., Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001a, 2001b; 
Feld, Fischer, and Kirchgässner, 2006).   
In Switzerland, data on individuals’ religious affiliations are collected on a decennial 
basis in the framework of the Swiss population census. About 90% of the population 
appear affiliated which makes it a reliable measure of the distribution of religion-based 
values. Missing values for the years between the available years 1980, 1990, and 2000 
have been linearly extrapolated. In the 26 Swiss cantons, the share of those who profess 
to be a ‘Protestant’ varies between about 5% (Wallis in 1980) and 80% (Bern 1980) 
(mean: 30% and standard deviation: 20%). In general, cross-sectional variation is 
substantially greater than the variation within a canton over time. In line with the 
modernization hypothesis, during the 1980 – 1998 time period, we observe a decline in 
the maximum share of Protestants from about 80% down to approximately 70%, and the 
mean and median, respectively (34% / 35% to 29% / 28%).
10  
                                                 
10 In the same time period, the minimum share rose from about 5% (Wallis in 1980) to 8% (Uri in 1998).       9 
Data on sub-federal expenses, namely combined cantonal and local expenses, were also 
obtained from the Swiss Federal Statistical office, as were most of the socio-economic 
controlling variables (share of young (< 20 years) and old population (> 60 years), degree 
of urbanization, a dummy that indicates whether the dominating language belongs to the 
Romance language tree or not). All spending measures have been deflated to the year 
1980 and are expressed in per capita values. Descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are reported in Appendix Table A.1.   
Turning to simple correlations of the cantonal share of Protestants with overall 
government spending (both in log-form), the small correlation coefficient suggest that 
both develop quite independently over time and across cantons (ρ = 0.0226). In contrast, 
in accordance with historical evolution of the Protestant movement, urbanized areas tend 
to be more Protestant than the countryside (ρ = 0.4595). In support of the conjectured 
preference for ‘living a controlled life’, Protestants have less children (compared to 
Catholics) (ρ = -0.4018), but, interestingly, get older (ρ = 0.3308), potentially 
contradicting the view that they work harder than Catholics – at least nowadays they do 
not seem to ‘overwork’, degenerating their physical ‘capital’. Finally, with a correlation 
coefficient of ρ = -0.2437 Protestants appear rather evenly distributed across the two 
major Swiss language regions in tri-lingual Switzerland (Romance-speaking 
(French/Italian) versus German-speaking).  
       10 
4)  Econometric Model 
Based on traditional public finance models, this paper assumes government spending in 
canton i at time t (Yit) to be a function of mainly socio-demographic factors. In a second 
step, further political and economic determinants of government spending are included to 
test the robustness of this baseline model. 
The focal variable is, however, the share of Protestants in a canton (Protit). According to 
our hypothesis, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient α. For the substantial 
correlations among the socio-demographic factors with our variable of interest observed 
in the raw data (see above), the vector of controlling variables Xit includes the share of 
young and old population as well as the degree of urbanization. It also includes a dummy 
controlling for the main language spoken in a canton to account for ethnic heterogeneity. 
In the context of public finance, these variables are interpreted as socio-demographic 
determinants of the demand for government spending (see, e.g. Feld and Matsusaka, 
2003). Inclusion of time fixed effects Tt completes our model: 
Yit = α Protit + β’ Xit + Tt + eit                                        (1) 
Based on previous empirical public finance studies for Swiss cantons, we follow the 
econometric approach chosen by Kirchgässner and Feld in their various contributions 
(e.g. 2001a, 2001b), to ensure comparability of their results with ours.
11 Thus, we employ 
                                                 
11  They argue that the inclusion of canton fixed effects is most likely to disguise the impact of (almost) 
time-invariant factors during the period of investigation. Given that the share of Protestantism does not 
substantially vary over time, and that missing values have been linearly interpolated, we follow their 
methodological approach. The de facto time-invariance of Protestantism also justifies assuming its 
exogeneity.        11 
most of the variables in their log-form, and calculate heteroscedasticity- and serial 
correlation- efficient OLS estimator with Newey-West standard errors, assuming a two-
lag correlation structure (AR2 process).  
To our knowledge, this analysis is one of the first to view religion-based values as an 
important determinant of government spending, substantially extending traditional public 
finance models.  
 
5)  Econometric Results 
Table 5.1 presents the results of our analysis. In equation (5.1), as regards the socio-
demographic controlling variables, cantons with a larger share of younger residents have 
significantly lower government spending levels, while the share of old and the degree of 
urbanization do not appear to matter.
12 Turning to our variable of interest, the coefficient 
estimate suggests that the share of Protestants is associated with lower levels of cantonal 
and local government spending (at the 1 percent significance level). In fact, interpreting 
the coefficient as point elasticity, an increase in the cantonal share of Protestants by 1 
percent is associated with a decrease in government spending by 0.051 percent. Thus, 
government spending is relatively inelastic to changes in Protestant population 
preferences, but nevertheless, is responsive in the predicted direction, with an effect 
larger (in abs. value) than the one of urbanization (-0.051 versus -0.013).
13 However an 
elasticity of this size does not necessarily imply that this cultural factor is not of 
                                                 
12 For a similar finding for Swiss cantons with respect to the young population, see Feld and Kirchgässner, 
2001 or Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner, 2006.  
13 The difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (F(1, 470) = 3.95)).        12 
economic importance, as even small changes in the dependent variable may have 
important implications for the state budget. Indeed, the mean of government spending is 
our data is about 10,500 Swiss Francs per capita and the mean population about 250,000 
inhabitants. Thus, an elasticity of -0.051 implies that an increase in Protestant population 
by three percentage points would lower government pending by overall 13,230,000 Swiss 
Francs per year for the average canton.  
However, as the share of Protestants is quite substantially correlated with the socio-
demographic determinants of sub-federal government spending included in the baseline 
model, the latter may well serve as socio-demographic transmission channel of 
Protestants’ preferences. For these reasons, the spending effects of Protestants values in 
the cantonal populations may well be mediated through their socio-demographic 
composition, a conjecture we test in the following equations 5.2 through 5.4.  
Equation (5.2) reports the results when the share of Protestants is interacted with the 
degree of cantonal urbanization. While the coefficient on the share of Protestants itself 
turns out significant with a negative sign in this model, supporting our hypothesis of a 
direct spending lowering partial effect, the negative coefficient on the degree of 
urbanization itself implies that in cities economies of scale in the provision of public 
goods are present, a result also reported in other empirical analyses for Swiss sub-federal 
spending (see e. g. Fischer, Feld and Kirchgässner, 2006). In contrast, the coefficient on 
the interaction term (0.024) is also highly significant (both at the 1 percent significance 
level), but with a positive sign. This positive interaction term indicates that the degrees of 
Protestant values and urbanization aggravate each other, both contributing to higher       13 
government spending. In consequence, the degree of urbanization appears to mitigate the 
spending lowering effect of Protestantism,  
Thus, the total fiscal impact of Protestantism depends on the values of the urbanization 
variables which varies substantially in the regression sample (in log-form, min: 0; max: 
4.59, reflecting a variation in urbanization across cantons from 1% to 99%),. However, 
for most degrees of urbanization, the total (marginal) impact of Protestantism appears 
still spending dampening (at the minimum of 1%; -0.108, at the mean of 16%: -0.041). 
Only for cantons that are urbanized with a degree of 90% (log(urban) = 4.5), the total 
marginal impact becomes zero, and thereafter slightly positive. In fact, the only canton 
with a spending increasing impact is the city canton Basel-city with an urbanization 
degree of 99%. However, in this canton the total marginal impact of ‘Protestantism’ 
amounts to a value close to zero (0.002). Overall, like in model 5.1, despite a 
counteracting, namely spending increasing effect exerted by Protestants in more 
urbanized areas, in total, they still exhibit an expenditure lowering influence. 
In equation (5.3), we interact the share of young persons with that of Protestants. While 
the coefficient on the share of Protestants turns out significant and positive (at the 1 
percent level), suggesting a (partial) spending increasing effect, the negative (and 
significant) interaction term suggests that the total marginal impact (also significant at the 
1 percent level) may vary with the socio-demographic composition of the cantonal 
population. In contrast, we observe no decisive impact of the share of young persons 
below 20 years per se.        14 
The calculation of the total marginal impact for different shares of young persons (in log 
form) in the regression sample shows that for cantons with an average share (and above) 
the total impact of Protestants is spending dampening (at the mean of 27%: -0.03; at the 
maximum of 36%: -0.14). In contrast, for the minimum fraction of about 17% the total 
impact of Protestant values appears even expenditure increasing (0.135). Indeed, the 
share of young persons at which the total marginal impact of Protestant population 
preferences is zero is about 24.7%, henceforth becoming negative as their share in the 
population rises. Thus, in cantons with a relatively young population the society being 
more adhering to ‘Protestant’ values appears equally spending lowering, as observed in 
the original equation (5.1).  
Finally, in equation (5.3), we interact our variable of interest with the share of old persons 
in a canton. However, the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term suggests that 
the share of old persons does not partially transmit population preferences that relate to 
having a Protestant world view. In contrast, the coefficient on the share of Protestants is 
still negative and significant, indicating a spending lowering impact (at the 10 percent 
level). In consequence, equation (5.3) is in line with the results observed in equation 
(5.1), supporting a total expenditure restraining influence of ‘Protestant’ population 
preferences.  
In general, for all equations (5.1.) to (5.4), qualitatively identical findings are obtained in 
a sample with outlier observations excluded (and normally distributed error terms).
14 In 
addition, the results are also robust to the exclusion of single cantons from the regression 
                                                 
14 Outlier observations are identified based on the size of their residuals are excluded (smaller than -2 or 
larger than 2 standard deviations).        15 
sample.
15 Overall, assuming exogeneity of de facto time-invariant religious composition 
of the cantonal populations, we find strong and robust evidence for a spending lowering 
impact of Protestants values.  
 
6)  Further empirical results – robustness tests 
As robustness test, we have tested the sensitivity of our results against other potentially 
confounding politico-economic factors, that are correlated both with our variable of 
interest and government spending. Such confounding factors could be income inequality 
and its redistribution, tax competition, fiscal decentralization, citizen empowerment 
through direct democracy, fiscal constraints, tax competition, national income and 
coalition governments.  
Based on the Calvinist predestination theory, Protestants may be less inclined to 
redistribute gross income via taxes and transfers to the needy, compared to Catholics, and 
may, in distaste of centralized bureaucratic and ecclesiastical control, prefer more 
decentralized governance structures, namely local decision-making and spending 
autonomy (Clark, 1951). Moreover, given the propensity to economize, they might have 
introduced statutory spending constraints to limit government spending, ceteris paribus. 
For the same reason, the dominance or Protestant values in the population might trigger 
more wealth compared to more Catholic cantons, ceteris paribus. Finally, Protestants may 
                                                 
15 For equation 5.1, Appendix Table A.2 shows the results of this exercise. A control for Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden in 1996 which sold their cantonal bank that year turns out insignificant.        16 
prefer larger coalition governments as a consequence of their dislike of being ruled by 
‘others’.  
Based on these thoughts, we test our model against the inclusion of the following 
variables: effective income redistribution (as measured by the distance between the gross 
and the post-transfer Gini coefficients), the net income inequality, the degree of cantonal 
spending decentralization, the strength of direct democratic institutions at the cantonal 
level (measured by a well known composite index of direct democracy ranging from ‘1’ 
to ‘6’), the presence and power of statutory spending constraints (the measure of which 
varies from ‘0’ to ‘4’), the degree of tax competition between cantons, the level of GDP 
disaggregated to the cantonal level per cantonal resident, and the number of parties 
forming a cantonal government (based on an indicator ranging from ‘1’ to ‘5’). In 
general, higher values indicate more influential political institutions. Most of the fiscal 
variables are obtained from the Federal Tax Administration and the Federal Statistical 
Office, while the political system-related measures are based on own calculations. These 
additional controls are widely used in public finance analyses of government spending in 
Swiss cantons and are described more detailed in, e.g., Feld, Fischer, and Kirchgässner 
(2006).
16  
The results in Table 6.1 show for all model specifications (6.1) through (6.9) that the 
share of Protestants in the population exerts a significant spending lowering impact, at 
least at the 10 percent level. The coefficient sizes vary from -0.064 (equation (6.8)) to  
-0.036 (equation (6.3)). The drop in magnitude (in absolute terms) (and partly in 
significance levels) observed particularly in equations (6.2) and (6.3) compared to the 
                                                 
16 For a detailed description of the construction of the direct democracy index, see Stutzer (1999).        17 
baseline model estimate of -0.051 (equation (6.1)) suggests that the degree in 
Protestantism is (partially) correlated with effective income redistribution and post-tax 
income inequality.
17  
Most of the additional controlling variables exert an impact that is in line with what 
common public finance literature suggests: Government expenditure rises with more 
income redistribution via taxes and transfers, higher post-tax income inequality 
(reflecting tax base and tax progression effects), and higher national income (equations 
(6.2), (6.3) and (6.8)). In contrast, government spending is lower in more fiscally 
decentralized cantons, in more direct democratic cantons, and in cantons with fiercer tax 
competition (equations (6.4), (6.5), and (6.7)). However, no significant impacts are 
observable for statutes that aim at balancing the cantonal budget or the size government 
coalitions (equations (6.6) and (6.9)).  
Taken all together, the robustness test of Table 6.1 supports our previous findings that a 
stronger prevalence of Protestants’ values in the cantonal population - as proxied by the 
cantonal share of persons with Protestant belief - is negatively associated with sub-federal 
general government spending in Swiss cantons.
18 
 
                                                 
17 The actual partial correlations with the (log of the) share of Protestants, conditional on the variables in 
the baseline model including the time fixed effects, are ρ = -0.25, ρ = -0.24, and ρ = 0.28 respectively. In 
contrast to expectations, the partial correlation with the (log of) cantonal GDP is only 0.13. 
18 The spending-lowering impact of the share of Protestants prevails (at least at the 5 percent significance 
level) if all control variables are simultaneously included in the model in various combinations, even if 
additionally augmented by population size, ideology of government, and the vertical lumpsum transfers 
from the federal government to the cantons. These model specifications then quite closely correspond to the 
public spending regressions estimated in e.g. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001).        18 
7)  Conclusion 
Based on Weber’s ‘Ascetic Protestantism’ theory, typical ‘Protestant values’ are related 
to catchwords such as ‘austerity’, ‘self-reliance’ and ‘own responsibility’, particularly in 
comparison with Catholic attitudes, in opposition to which the ‘Protestant’ movement 
evolved. This paper addresses the question whether the prevalence of such values in the 
population restrains costly government activity.  
In Switzerland, in which the two dominating religions are Catholicism and Protestantism, 
we identify for a panel of 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 1998 a constraining impact 
of Protestantism on combined cantonal and local government spending. This effect is 
robust to taking into account differences in time-variant political factors, economic 
condition, or potentially correlated governance structures, namely direct democratic 
institutions and spending decentralization. Moreover, a transmission channel analysis 
reveals that the socio-demographic composition of the canton in terms of youth and 
urbanization partly serves as mediating factors. However, the total marginal impact of 
Protestantism remains consistently negative. Overall, our results show that an increase in 
the population share of Protestants by 1 percentage point leads to a considerable decrease 
in government spending by about 1.5 percent, which may amount for the average canton 
to savings of 150 Swiss Francs per capita or of a total of more than 37 million Swiss 
Francs.  
In consequence, our analysis suggests that population preferences relating to differing 
value systems should not be omitted from future empirical public finance analyses. In 
particular, traditional models might well over- or understate the influence of some socio-      19 
demographic or institutional determinants, potentially leading to a misguided real-life 
policy prioritization.   
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9)  Tables  
 
Table 5.1: Results for the dependent variable – total cantonal 
expenditure – basic model 
 
Equation/Estimated coefficient 
Independent Variable  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4 
log (Prot.)  -0.051***  -0.108***  1.222***  -0.657* 
  [3.14]  [3.81]  [2.96]  [1.76] 
log (young)  -1.162***  -1.136***  0.036  -1.174*** 
  [7.46]  [7.39]  [0.09]  [7.57] 
log (old)  0.101  0.074  0.045  -0.575 
  [0.87]  [0.62]  [0.39]  [1.24] 
log (urban)  -0.013  -0.083***  -0.012  -0.014 
  [1.38]  [2.97]  [1.32]  [1.42] 
Dummy for Romance language  0.098***  0.114***  0.118***  0.101*** 
  [3.89]  [4.57]  [4.73]  [4.04] 
log (Prot.)* log (urban)    0.024***     
    [2.63]     
log (Prot.)* log (young)      -0.381***   
      [3.08]   
log (Prot.)* log (old)        0.206 
        [1.60] 
Constant  12.862***  13.141***  9.151***  15.030*** 
  [15.75]  [16.28]  [6.42]  [9.92] 
Test Statistics         
Observations  494  494  494  494 
F-test   10.71  13.37  15.72  15.38 
(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adj. R2  0.5957  0.6082  0.6194  0.6005 
d.f.   470  469  469  469 
Notes: Dependent variable is the per capital total sub-federal expenditure in a canton (in log form). 
Estimation with OLS and serial correlation and heteroscedasticity consistent Newey-West standard errors. 
Time fixed effects are included but not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
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Table 6.1: Results for the cantonal expenditure per capita – robustness tests 
Equation/Estimated coefficients 
Independent Variables 
6.1  6.2  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.6  6.7  6.8  6.9 
log (Prot.)  -0.051***  -0.038**  -0.036*  -0.061***  -0.049***  -0.049***  -0.055***  -0.064***  -0.059*** 
  [3.14]  [2.13]  [1.94]  [3.94]  [2.98]  [3.01]  [3.27]  [4.55]  [3.06] 
log (young)  -1.162***  -0.887***  -0.897***  -1.098***  -1.099***  -1.130***  -1.134***  -0.408**  -1.105*** 
  [7.46]  [5.14]  [5.24]  [7.90]  [7.38]  [7.09]  [7.43]  [2.19]  [6.84] 
log (old)  0.101  0.332***  0.320***  0.197*  0.118  0.105  0.087  0.593***  0.124 
  [0.87]  [2.64]  [2.64]  [1.91]  [1.07]  [0.90]  [0.80]  [5.25]  [1.04] 
log (urban)  -0.013  -0.013  -0.014  0.016  -0.021*  -0.012  -0.009  -0.005  -0.013 
  [1.38]  [1.14]  [1.15]  [1.35]  [1.94]  [1.19]  [0.95]  [0.56]  [1.41] 
Dummy for Romance language  0.098***  0.145***  0.135***  0.033  0  0.101***  0.033  0.151***  0.093*** 
  [3.89]  [4.81]  [4.82]  [1.09]  [0.01]  [4.04]  [0.93]  [6.15]  [3.63] 
income redistribution    0.241***               
    [3.38]               
after-tax income inequality      0.024***             
      [3.97]             
Fiscal decentralization        -0.611***           
        [3.09]           
Direct democracy          -0.047***         
          [3.10]         
Fiscal constraints            -0.009       
            [1.41]       
Tax competition              -0.518***     
              [2.59]     
Log (national income)                0.502***   
                [6.50]   
Coalition government                  0.019 
                  [1.36] 
Constant  12.862***  10.942***  10.729***  12.555***  12.985***  12.880***  12.954***  3.564**  12.651*** 
  [15.75]  [11.55]  [11.29]  [17.64]  [16.46]  [15.83]  [17.00]  [2.24]  [14.88] 
Test Statistics                   
Observations  494  391  391  494  494  494  494  494  494 
F-test   10.71  183.40  202.45  10.44  9.81  10.71  10.29  22.52  10.46 
(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000       25 
Adj. R2  0.5957  0.6225  0.6323  0.6278  0.6103  0.5965  0.6132  0.6583  0..5980 
d.f.   470  396  369  469  469  469  469  469  469 
Notes: See table 5.1 





Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
           
log (spending)  494  9.24  0.23  8.82  9.86 
gov. spending  494  10581.28  2610.31  6801.75  19221.50 
log (Prot.)  494  3.18  0.81  1.60  4.35 
Prot.  494  31.74  20.38  4.94  77.53 
gov. spending  494  10581.28  2610.31  6801.75  19221.50 
log (young)  494  3.30  0.14  2.85  3.58 
young  494  27.23  3.59  17.33  35.70 
log (old)  494  2.95  0.12  2.62  3.30 
old  494  19.26  2.44  13.70  27.07 
log (urban)  494  2.81  1.46  0  4.59512 
urban  494  30.72  24.13  1  99 
Romance language  494  0.27  0.44  0  1 
income redistribution  391  1.05  0.21  0.57  1.68 
after-tax inequality  391  29.18  2.30  23.53  37.81 
Fiscal decentralization  494  0.35  0.09  0.12  0.50 
Direct democracy  494  4.29  1.22  1.5  5.83 
fiscal constraints  494  0.37  1.08  0  4 
tax competition  494  0.24  0.08  0.1  0.42 
log (national income)  494  10.68  0.20  10.32  11.44 
Coalition government  494  3.25  0.86  1  5 
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Table A2: Exclusion of single cantons from sample for baseline model 
(equation 5.1) 
 
Estimate for variable of 
interest 
Estimate for variable of 
interest  Excluded 











Zurich  -.052***  -.071***  Schaffhausen  -.046***  -.065*** 
Bern  -.053***  -.074***  Appenzell AR  -.050***  -.067*** 
Luzern  -.054***  -.069***  Appenzell IR  -.056***  -.079*** 
Uri  -.029***  -.057***  St. Gallen  -.051***  -.069*** 
Schwyz  -.064***  -.080***  Graubünden  -.063***  -.073*** 
Obwalden  -.048***  -.059***  Aargau  -.039***  -.057*** 
Nidwalden  -.048***  -.072***  Thurgau  -.045***  -.063*** 
Glarus  -.058***  -.084***  Ticino  -.082***  -.085*** 
Zug  -.046***  -.063***  Waadt  -.050***  -.069*** 
Freiburg  -.049***  -.069***  Wallis  -.052***  -.070*** 
Solothurn  -.050***  -.067***  Neuenburg  -.049***  -.070*** 
Basel-City  -.033  -.052***  Geneva  -.054***  -.067*** 
Basel-
Country 
-.045***  -.064***  Jura  -.050***  -.064*** 
Notes: See table 5.2. Reduced sample equals full sample minus one excluded canton. Outlier observations 
are excluded based on the 1.5 standard deviations of the residuals of the reduced sample. 
 
 